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The Impact of Recent Litigation on Interlibrary 
Loan and Document Delivery* 
James S. Heller** 
Professor Heller discusses how two recent federal copyright law decisions, 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music in the United States Supreme Court and 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco in the Second Circuit, may affect 
the interlibrary loan and document delivery services provided by libraries. 
Introduction 
Although neither directly involved libraries, two recent federal court decisions 
may have significant repercussions for interlibrary lending and document 
delivery activities by libraries. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 1 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the rap group 2 Live Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's 
"Oh Pretty Woman" qualified as a fair use under section 107 of the Copyright 
Act of 1976. Most significant was the unanimous Court's analysis of the fair 
use doctrine itself, and the guidelines established for examining the fair use 
defense in future copyright infringement cases. Shortly after Campbell, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down its decision in 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco.2 In a 2-1 decision, the court held that 
Texaco's systematic institutional policy of multiplying the available number 
of copies of copyrighted journal articles by circulating the journals among 
Texaco's scientists who then made copies of articles was not fair use. 
For.many years librarians have used interlibrary lending and document 
delivery services as methods of providing information to their patrons. Have 
Campbell and Texaco placed these activities in jeopardy? Focusing on the fair 
use3 (section 107) and library exemption4 (section 108) provisions of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, this article discusses how the Campbell and Texaco 
decisions may affect interlibrary loan and library document delivery activities. 
Before going further, two definitions are in order. For purposes of this 
paper, interlibrary lending (or loan) refers to requests made by one library (A) 
* James S. Heller, 1996. 
** Director of the Marshall-Wythe Law Library and Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia. 
1. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994). 
2. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir.), superseding 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1995). 
3. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1994). 
4. 17 u.s.c. § 108 (1994). 
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to another library (B) to obtain from B copies of works not held by A, for the 
use by A:s primary clientele-the patrons it serves directly. If A is a university 
library, its primary clientele will be the students and faculty of the university; 
if a corporate or law firm library, the employees of the corporation or firm; if 
a court library, the judges and law clerks of the court. Document delivery refers 
to the provision of materials to patrons not affiliated with the library or its 
parent institution, such as a university library providing copies of articles to 
corporate researchers. 
Staking Out Positions-Librarians and Publishers 
Applying copyright law to library activities remains as difficult-and vola~ 
tile-an issue today as it was two decades ago when Congress was completing 
its revision of the 1909 Copyright Act. When it comes to document delivery, 
temperatures rise a few more degrees. And when the discussion turns to 
transmitting documents electronically, the dialogue gets even hotter. 
At one extreme, a few librarians view interlibrary lending and document 
delivery as an entitlement that should have few, if any, limitations. They see 
copyright law as an impediment that unjustly interferes with what they perceive 
to be a "right" to copy documents for anyone, at any time. Thankfully, few 
librarians fall into this category. On the other end is the Association of 
American Publishers (AAP), which sees document delivery as a serious threat 
to the economic well-being of publishers, the protection of which they appar-
ently believe is the sole reason for the existence of copyright law. 
In 1992 the AAP released a position paper stating-quite correctly-that 
commercial document delivery services must secure permission from, and (if 
requested) pay royalties to, the copyright holder.5 To be sure, for-profit docu-
ment deliverers can only copy and deliver copyrighted works with permission. 
The AAP took a giant leap, however, and claimed that fee-based document 
delivery services in libraries "are indistinguishable in purpose and effect from 
those of commercial document delivery suppliers," and also must receive 
permission or pay royalties.6 This is not supported by either the law or the 
legislative history. 
The AAP also has expressed its concern over scanning. In a 1994 position 
paper, it wrote that "copyright owners are greatly concerned about the conver-
sion of a document into digital form, since the impact of this practice differs 
from and goes beyond even the existing damage from unauthorized photocopy-
ing."7 The AAP asserted that distributing copyrighted works among libraries 
already results "in lost subscription revenue and lost royalty income ... [and 
5. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 
{AAP) ON COMMERCIAL AND FEE-BASED DOCUMENT DELIVERY 1 {1992). 
6. !d. 
7. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS, AAP POSITION PAPER ON SCANNING 2 {1994). 
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that] unauthorized scanning can easily increase such losses."8 The publishing 
industry feels concerned with both the ease with which digitized versions of 
copyrighted works can be retransmitted to large numbers of recipients and also 
with how easily digitized works can be manipulated.9 
The publishers have a strong ally in the Information Industry Association 
(IIA), which represents more than 500 companies that pursue business oppor-
tunities associated with the creation, distribution, and use of information. The 
IIA believes that libraries that provide document delivery services without 
paying royalties have an unfair advantage over commercial information bro-
kers who do because libraries can price their services lower. The IIA asserts 
that libraries that promote and offer fee-based services beyond their primary 
patron base are engaged in commercial copying and are not protected by fair 
use or the library exemption. 10 
Interlibrary Lending 
Section 108 permits a library, under certain circumstances, to make a single 
copy of a periodical article or small excerpt of a larger work (such as a book 
chapter) upon request of the library's patron or in response to a request from 
another library on behalf of that library's patron. This right is subject to two 
conditions. Subsection (g)(1) of section 108 prohibits a library from engaging 
in related or concerted copying or distribution of either single or multiple 
copies of the same material on one occasion or over a period of time. 11 
Subsection (g)(2) prohibits a library from engaging in the systematic reproduc-
tion of single or multiple copies of articles or short excerpts. Libraries may, 
however, participate in interlibrary arrangements that do not have as their 
purpose or effect the receipt of copies in such aggregate quantities as to 
substitute for a subscription to or purchase of a work.12 Section 108, therefore, 
8. /d. at3. 
9. One commentator has suggested that telefacsimile transmission should not present a threat to 
publishers and authors so long as libraries observe restrictions within the Copyright Act and the 
CONTU Guidelines. David Ensign, Copyright Considerations for Telefacsimile Transmission of 
Documents in Interlibrary Loan Transactions, 81 LAW LIBR. J. 805, 812 (1989). 
10. "I think the economic pressures on libraries to come up with additional revenues have pushed 
them into exercising some essentially commercial enterprises in functioning like these infonna-
tion retailers that I was describing .... What that essentially has done is create two kinds of 
information delivery services at that retail level: the commercial firms that recognize that they 
have to pay copyright, and the libraries which deny that they have to pay copyright. It creates 
basically unfair competition between the two entities .•.• I hope your report would foreclose the 
possibility that an interpretation of Section 108, or Section 107 for that matter, could lead to the 
sanctioning of commercial-like photocopying within mainly large research libraries." COPYRIGHT 
OFF., U.S. LIBR. CONGRESS, PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON 
THE EFFECTS OF 17 U.S.C. 108 ON THE RIGHTS OF CREATORS AND THE NEEDS OF USERS OF WoRKS 
REPRODUCED BY CERTAIN LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES, April 8-9, 1987 app. at 142-43 (1987) 
(statement of Paul Zurkowski, President, IIA). 
11. 17 u.s.c. § 108(g)(l). 
12. /d. § 108(g)(2). 
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allows isolated and unrelated copying and distribution of single copies of the 
same or different materials on separate occasions, but interlibrary lending that 
is systematic may be viewed as substituting for a subscription or the purchase 
of the work. 
Congress failed to provide a definition of systematic copying in the act, nor 
is there an adequate explanation in the committee reports that constitute the 
legislative history of the act.13 However, during th~ legislative process, the 
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU) submitted to the appropriate Senate and House committees guide-
lines adopted by the commission to govern practices under section 108(g)(2). 
Sometimes called the "Rule of 5," but more appropriately labeled the "Sugges-
tion of 5," the CONTU guidelines were included in the conference report.14 
They suggest that a library uses interlibrary loan as a substitute for a subscrip-
tion to a journal when, in any one calendar year, it requests more than five 
copies of articles from the same journal title published within the last five 
years. To facilitate a determination under this guideline, libraries are to main-
tain three full calendar years of records of requests made and filled. 15 Although 
CONTU did not specify the content of those records, they probably should 
include the date of the request; the title, volume, and publication date of the 
journal issue; the name of the article and its pagination; and the requestor's 
name and institutional affiliation. 
The guidelines are addressed primarily to libraries that request copies of 
articles, but they also speak to libraries that receive requests for copies. Under 
the guidelines, a library should not provide a copy absent attestation by the 
requesting library that the request complies with the guidelines.16 A requesting 
library alternatively may attest that the request complies with the fair use 
provision of the act. 
13. S. RPT. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H. RPT. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; H. CoNF. RPT. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810. 
14. Prefatory to presenting the guidelines, the report states: 
The conference committee understands that the guidelines are not intended as, and cannot be considered, 
explicit rules or directions governing any and all cases, now or in the future. It is recognized that their 
purpose is to provide guidance in the most commonly-encountered interlibrary photocopying situations, 
that they are not intended to be limiting or determinative in themselves or with respect to other situations; 
and that they deal with an evolving situation that will undoubtedly require their continuous reevaluation 
and adjustment. With these qualifications, the conference committee agrees that the guidelines are a 
reasonable interpretation of the provision of section I 08(g)(2) in the most common situations to wltich 
they apply today. H. CONF. RPT. NO. 1733, supra note 13, at 71-72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5812-13. 
15. Id. at 72-73, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5813-14. 
16. Guideline 3 states: "No request for a copy or phonorecord of any material to which these 
guidelines apply may be filled by the supplying entity unless such request is accompanied by a 
representation by the requesting entity that the request was made in conformity with these 
guidelines." /d. at 73, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5814. 
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Document Delivery 
About a decade ago some large academic research libraries began expanding 
their services to patrons not affiliated with the library or its parent institution 
by providing document delivery for a fee. Other libraries followed suit, and 
today a large number of libraries offer such servicesY Demand for these 
services expanded as new technologies-telefacsimile in the 1980s, and scan-
ning in the 1990s-enabled remote users to receive documents from libraries 
in minutes, rather than days. 
Just as libraries are of various sizes and types, so are document delivery 
operations. Although most libraries seek merely to recoup their actual costs, 
some hope to profit from document delivery. Some large-scale services func-
tion as a separate division within large (usually university) libraries and 
operate with revenues generated by the service. Less ambitious libraries 
usually provide document delivery through their interlibrary loan department. 
Whether libraries can engage in fee-based document delivery services 
without permission from the copyright owner or payment of royalties depends 
on the answers to several questions, including who requested the copy; how 
the requestor will use the copy; what the nature is of the material copied and 
how much of it is copied; how much the library charges for the copy; how the 
library uses its revenue; and how much aggregate copying the library conducts. 
The answers to these questions will help determine whether library document 
delivery is permitted under either section 107 or section 108 of the act, or 
instead that permission for use or payment of royalties is required. 
Section 108-The Library Exemption 
A library must meet three threshold requirements to qualify for protection 
under section 108. The first requirement, which has generated much contro-
versy, is that the copying must be done without a purpose of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage. 18 A library that profits from its document delivery 
activities or that sets up a separate document delivery unit that so profits cannot 
qualify for the section 108 exemption. The publishing industry, as noted earlier, 
considers fee-based library services indistinguishable from commercial serv-
ices, regardless of whether a profit is made. The publishers contend mistakenly 
that these libraries lose section 108 protection even if they do not. profit from 
their activities. While it may be conceded that a library whose fees exceed its 
direct and indirect costs-allowing it to expand its collection, for example-
loses protection under section 108, a library that merely recoups its costs 
17. THE FISCAL DIRECTORY OF FEE-BASED RESEARCH AND DOCUMENT SUPPLY SERVICES {County of 
Los Angeles Public Library/American Library Association, 1993) lists more than one hundred 
library document providers. 
18. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1). 
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(including equipment, labor, utilities, supplies, postage, and other overhead) 
and does not profit from the service, is not automatically disqualified from the 
section 108 exemption. 
The second threshold requirement for a section 108 exemption is that a 
library be open to the public or to persons doing research in a specialized 
field. 19 There is some debate as to whether libraries in for-profit institutions 
closed to the general public meet this requirement. A former Register of 
Copyrights concluded that the open access requirement, along with the prohi-
bition against copying for the purpose of direct or indirect commercial advan-
tage mentioned above, limits the ability of libraries in for-profit institutions to 
qualify under section 108.20 That interpretation seems contrary to the intent of 
Congress, however; Congress did not intend to limit section 108 to public or 
university libraries.21 A library that permits other researchers access to its 
collections through interlibrary lending should qualify for the section 108 
exemption so long as it meets the other requirements of that section.22 
The final threshold requirement of section 108 is that a notice of copyright 
appear on all copies distributed under this section.23 To meet this requirement, 
a library should either reproduce the formal notice that often appears within 
the publication, or alternatively, it might stamp the document with the notice 
recommended by the American Association of Law Libraries: ''This material 
is subject to the United States Copyright law: Further reproduction in violation 
of that law is prohibited."24 
Under section 108(d) a library may copy articles from copyrighted works 
under certain circumstances. First, a library may make only a single copy at 
any one time, and that copy must become the property of the user. Librarians 
should observe this straightforward rule as if delivered· from the heavens: 
Never send more than one reproduction of a copyrighted work to a requestor, 
and never retain a copy of an article sent. Second, the library also must have 
had "no notice that the copy ... would be used for any purpose other than 
private study, scholarship, or research."25 Although there is no affirmative duty 
19. ld. § 108(a)(2). 
20. COPYRIGHT OFF., U.S. LIBR. CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODUC· 
TION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. 108) 75-86 (1986). 
21. "Similarly, for-profit libraries could participate in interlibrary arrangements for exchange of 
photocopies, as long as the reproduction or distribution was not 'systematic.' These activities, by 
themselves, would ordinarily not be considered 'for direct or indirect commercial advantage,' 
since the 'advantage' referred to in this clause must attach to the immediate commercial 
motivation behind the reproduction or distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate profit-making 
motivation behind the enterprise in which the library is located." H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 
12 at 75, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.A.N at 5689. 
22. LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
IN THE 1990'S, at 45 (1994). 
23. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(3}. 
24. JAMES S. HELLER & SARAH K. WIANT, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 16-17 (1982). 
25. 17 u.s.c. § 108(d)(l}. 
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to ascertain the requestor's intended use of the materials, to remain safe, a 
library should avoid making copies for for-profit information brokers. 
Some might argue that section 108 does not encompass the provisiqn of 
copies to employees of for-profit companies, but that interpretation is unduly 
restrictive. Clearly, Congress did not intend to exclude for-profit libraries from 
section 108.26 Moreover, the exemption applies both to libraries that supply 
and receive copies. The Texaco decision does not prohibit a library from 
copying an article for a corporate employee, nor does it limit an employee's 
right to receive such articles. Not only is Texaco limited to the specific facts 
of that dispute-and therefore does not directly implicate library document 
delivery activities-but it was decided under the fair use provision of the act 
rather than section 108. 
As noted above, a library's right to send or receive copies of journal articles 
is not without limits. Section 108(g)(1) prohibits related or concerted repro-
duction of single or multiple copies of the same article. A library that provides 
single copies of the same article to a variety of independent users does not run 
afoul of this provision if each act of copying is isolated and unrelated. 
Subsection (g)(2), which directly implicates library document delivery, 
prohibits the systematic copying or distribution of multiple or single copies of 
subsection (d) materials, such as articles. This proviso is designed to prevent 
a reduction in the value of or market for a work-a subscription to a journal, 
a journal issue, or a single article. From the copyright owner's standpoint there 
is direct or potential economic value for each. 
Because subsection (g)(2) prohibits the systematic copying of the same 
article or different articles from the same journal, former Register of Copy-
rights David Ladd suggested that large-scale library copying services that 
employ full-time staff, advertise, and make lots of copies probably engage in 
systematic copying.27 But there seems to be no clear demarcation line as to 
when a library's activities become "systematic." And the only reported deci-
sion involving library copying that might have implications for section 108 
was decided prior to the 1976 copyright revision legislation. 
In Williams & Wilkins v. United States,28 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
by a four-to-four vote a 1973 U.S. Court of Claims decision that large-scale 
copying by the National Library of Medicine (NLM) and the National Institute 
of Health (NIH) was fair use. Williams & Wilkins deals with fair use (rather 
than with section 108, which did not exist unti11976), and it will be discussed 
at greater length later in this article. It is worthwhile to make one point now, 
26. See H. RPT. No. 1476, supra note 13, at 74-75, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5688-89; infra 
text accompanying notes 28-29. 
27. COPYRIGHT OFF., U.S. LIBR. CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY RBPRODUC· 
TION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 U.S.C. 108) 140 (1983). 
28. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
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however. Although NIH copied only for its own staff, about 12 percent of 
NLM's requests came from private or commercial organizations, drug compa-
nies in particular. In other words, NLM engaged in document delivery. 
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted 
Works convened a few years after the Williams & Wilkins decision. Since 
large-scale fee-based document delivery services did not exist in 1978, it is not 
surprising that CONTU did not examine the issue in its final report.29 But the 
commission did discuss nonprofit copying centers established for the exclusive 
purpose of providing copies of articles. 
CONTU first questioned whether centers such as the British Library 
Lending Division would qualify as a library or archives under the 1976 act and, 
therefore, might qualify for the section 108 exemption. Concluding that they 
were not and did not so qualify, the commission proceeded to state that other 
libraries could not receive photocopies of articles from such copy centers under 
section 108.30 In other words, not only must nonprofit centers established for 
the specific purpose of providing copies secure authorization prior to copying, 
but other libraries could not receive copies from such "document supply 
centers" under section 108. 
The Texaco decision should not directly impact library copying under 
section 108. Because the parties agreed that the dispute would be decided under 
the section 107 fair use provision, any statements by the court on section 108 
should be considered dictum.31 Still, in the trial court decision District Court 
Judge Pierre Laval commented that the copying by Texaco was not permitted 
under section 108. His analysis was mistaken for several reasons. 
Judge Laval noted that Texaco makes photocopies solely for commercial 
advantage and therefore concluded that Texaco could not meet the section 108 
requirement that copies be made without the purpose of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage. The legislative history to the act says otherwise-for-
profit companies may qualify for the section 108 exemption: 
Isolated, spontaneous making of single photocopies by a library in a for-profit organi-
zation, without any systematic effort to substitute photocopying for subscriptions or 
purchases, would be covered by section 108, even though the copies are furnished to 
the employees of the organization for use in their work .... These activities, by them-
selves, would ordinarily not be considered "for direct or indirect commercial advantages," 
29. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978). 
30. "If such nonprofit copying centers are not libraries or archives within the meaning of the 1976 
Act, other libraries would not have the benefits of Section 1 08( d) and its extension in the Section 
108(g)(2) proviso and the CONTU guidelines in securing photocopies of articles from them." !d. 
at 162. 
31. District Court Judge Pierre Laval wrote "[I]t is questionable whether lawfulness under Section 
108 comes within the scope of this trial which, by stipulation, covers only the issue [sic] fair use. 
Fair use is covered by Section 107. Section 108 is a separate special statutory exemption governed 
by an entirely different set of standards." American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 
1, 28 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
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since the "advantage" referred to in this clause must attach to the immediate commercial 
motivation behind the reproduction and distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate 
profit-making motivation behind the enterprise in which the library is located.32 
Judge Laval also wrote that a "library that qualifies under § 108 could 
deliver a maximum of one copy of a particular item to Texaco .... If 
Chickering obtains a copy of an article, there is no procedure barring his 
Texaco colleagues from copying the same article."33 Under this approach, 
when one Texaco scientist received a copy of an article under section 108, no 
other scientists could ever receive a copy of that same article. This approach 
cannot be justified by a reading of the act or its legislative history. The 
subsection (g)(l) and (g)(2) provisos prohibit related and concerted as well as 
systematic copying; they do not prohibit two individuals from the same organi-
zation from receiving copies of the same article. For that matter, neither do the 
CONTU Guidelines. Not surprisingly, the appellate court did not discuss 
section 108; but at the same time, it did not point out Judge Laval's mistakes. 
The scope of permissible library document delivery under section 108 
remains unsettled. Although CONTU provided some guidance for libraries that 
receive copies of articles, few objective criteria exist to determine the permis-
sible scope of library document delivery. Any such analysis would, in all 
likelihood, require answers to the several questions posed earlier. Those 
answers-as well as a finding whether the copyright owner was harmed by the 
copying-also will help determine whether the copying is permitted under 
section 107, the fair use provision of the act. 
Section 107-Fair Use 
Section 107 provides that the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. Applying section 107 to library document delivery appears 
to warrant a two-part analysis. Because a library arguably acts as the agent for 
the requestor, one may contend that the library should be able to do for the 
requestor what the requestor him or herself may do. (Conversely, a library may 
be prohibited from making copies for a requestor when the requestor may not 
do so.)34 As the entity that makes the copy, the library also must justify its 
32. H. RPT. No. 1476, supra note 13, at 75, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5689. 
33. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 28. 
34. Note the very different analyses by the Williams & Wilkins judges. The majority stated that "[t]he 
NIH and NLM systems ..• are close kin to the current Library Of Congress Policy • . • of 
maintaining machines in the library buildings so that readers can do their own copying. The 
principal extension by NLM and NIH is to service requestors who cannot conveniently come to 
the building, as well as out-of-town libraries." Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1355. Compare 
this with the statement of the dissent: "There is no showing that these alleged ... principals have 
any say in the formulation of the policies and practices of the photocopying operation •••. The 
essential elements of agency are wholly lacking." I d. at 1367 (Cowen, C.J., dissenting). 
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copying under fair use. In Williams & Wilkins the court of claims found that 
copying by the National Institute of Health and the National Library of 
Medicine aided scientific research, a purpose the court did not want to impede. 
The court appropriately focused its attention on the purpose of the libraries 
that supplied the copies; as a secondary matter they looked at the activities of 
the requestors. Thus, it is important to look at fair use from the perspective of 
both the requestor and of the supplying library.35 
The First Fair Use Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use 
Congress mandated that courts consider no fewer than four factors in deter-
mining whether a use is fair. The first factor examines the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether the use is of a commercial nature or, 
instead, for nonprofit educational purposes. (Nonprofit educational uses are 
favored over commercial uses.) Libraries provide document delivery to assist 
in disseminating information for the needs of distant users. When copies are 
made for individuals outside the library's primary client base-even when 
academic libraries serve the corporate sector-the purpose, although not non-
profit educational, is at worst benign. 
As for the requestor's fair use rights, section 107 clearly favors copying 
by educators, students, and nonprofit researchers. (Indeed, the preamble to 
section 107 expressly identifies copying for scholarship or research purposes 
as within the ambit of fair use.) Copyright owners might argue that because 
Texaco limits the right of corporate researchers to rely on fair use for making 
copies of articles, it follows that libraries cannot provide those researchers the 
same materials through document delivery. 
When examining the first factor, courts today consider whether the use is 
"productive" or "transformative." In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, the Su-
preme Court commented that the central purpose of the first factor is whether 
the new work merely supplants the original (nontransformative) or, instead, 
whether it "adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."36 In considering 
35. The Sixth Circuit recently took this approach in Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document 
Services, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g granted, No. 94-1778 (6th Cir. April 
9, 1996). In examining whether a commercial copyshop's making course packs for use by college 
students was fair, the court examined both the actions of the copyshop that made the copies, and 
the students who purchased (and used) them. The disposition of this case had not been resolved 
at the time this article went to press. 
36. Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1171. Some might consider this a significant change from a decade earlier. 
In 1984 the Court stated that "Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis calls for a 
sensitive balancing of interests. The distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses 
may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative." Sony Corp of 
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,455 n.40 (1984). Although many thought Sony 
discredited the productive use test, the Court merely clarified that it was one of several factors 
to be considered. In fact, both the Campbell and Sony Courts concluded that the respective uses 
were fair. 
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this element of the first factor, the Texaco court found that the Texaco re-
searcher copied the articles to create his own mini-library, or archive: "[T]he 
dominant purpose of the use is 'archival'-to assemble a set of papers for 
future reference, thereby serving the same purpose for which additional sub-
scriptions are normally sold, or, as will be discussed, for which photocopy 
licenses may be obtained."37 The court also reasoned that copying articles to 
engage infuture research was not transformative, even though the researcher 
who made the copy might use information from that article to create an entirely 
new work.38 
Campbell emphasizes that specific facts by themselves will not dictate 
whether the first factor favors the plaintiff or defendant. A commercial use by 
the defendant, by itself, does not mean that the first factor will favor the 
plaintiff. Neither will a nonproductive use, by itself, preclude a finding that 
this factor favors the·defendant.39 
The Texaco court found that copying by a corporate researcher was for a 
commercial purpose and nontransformative and concluded that the first factor 
clearly favored the plaintiff. The court did not indict all corporate sector 
copying, however. It emphasized that its holding rested on the specific facts of 
the case: systematic copying and archiving that resulted from wide-scale 
routing of journals to which Texaco subscribed.40 The court stated: 
The parties and many of the amici curiae have approached this case as if it concerns the 
broad issue of whether photocopying of scientific articles is fair use .... Such broad 
issues are not before us. Rather, we consider whether Texaco's photocopying by 400 or 
500 scientists ... is fair use. This includes the question whether such institutional, 
systematic copying increases the number of copies available to scientists while avoiding 
the necessity of paying license fees or for additional subscriptions. We do not deal with 
the question of copying by an individual, for personal use in research or otherwise (not 
for resale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such 
a practice of an individual might well not constitute infringement.41 
37. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 892. 
38. "Moreover, the concept of a 'transformative' use would be extended beyond recognition if it was 
applied to Chickering's copying simply because he acted in the course of doing research. The 
purposes iiiustrated in section 107 refer primarily to the work of authorship alleged to be a fair 
use, not to the activity in which the alleged infringer is engaged. Texaco cannot gain fair use 
insulation for Chickering's archival photocopying of articles (or books) simply because such 
copying is done by a company doing research." !d. 
39. A recent federal district court decision stated that in examining the "purpose" a court should 
consider whether the use was commercial or noncommercial, including whether the use was for 
one of the favored purposes mentioned explicitly in the preamble to section 107. Examining the 
"character" of the use requires a determination whether the use was transformative or productive. 
College Entrance Examination Board v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp 554, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The court 
also noted the possible tension inherent in the purpose and character elements of the first factor. 
Finding that the "purpose" was noncommercial, but that the "character" was nontransformative, 
the court concluded that the first factor favored neither party. 
40. "Our ruling is confined to the institutional, systematic, archival multiplication of copies revealed 
by the record-the precise copying that the parties stipulated should be the basis for the District 
Court's decision now on appeal." Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931. 
41. ld. at 916. 
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The Texaco court did not say that a corporate employee could not occasionally 
copy articles for his or her research. Nor did it say that a corporate researcher 
could not request from a library a single copy of an article from a journal to which 
the corporation does not subscribe. The court took great care to limit its holding 
to the specific facts of the case; librarians and their institutions ought not jump to 
conclusions that the court itself chose not to reach. 
The Second Factor: Nature of the Work Copied 
A fair use analysis also requires consideration of the nature of the work copied. 
In practice, one may more readily copy factual or informational works than 
creative works.42 Even the Texaco court concluded that this factor favored the 
defendant.43 Document deliverers rarely copy creative works (such as fiction 
or poetry), and the second factor would likely work in their favor.44 
The Third Factor: The Amount Copied 
Fair use also requires consideration of the amount of the work copied. As a 
general matter, the more that is copied, the less the use is likely to be considered 
fair. Because libraries typically copy and distribute entire journal articles, each 
of which is copyrightable, this factor leans against a fair use finding.45 (Indeed, 
courts may find infringement even for the use of very small portions of 
copyrighted works.)46 Noting that the Texaco researcher copied entire articles 
42. "Under this factor, the more creative a work, the more protection it should be accorded from 
copying; correlatively, the more informational or functional the plaintiff's work, the broader 
should be the scope of the fair use defense." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][2][a] (1995). See also Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1175 (brief discussion of 
issue in which the Court cites Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984); Feist v. Rural Telephone 
Service, 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1991)). 
43. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 925. A court also is likely to examine whether the original work is published 
or unpublished. Although a 1992 amendment to section 107 provides that the unpublished nature 
of a work will not bar a finding of fair use, there is less freedom to copy unpublished works under 
this section. However, a section 108 library may copy an unpublished work "in facsimile form 
solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for research use in another [section 
108] library ... if the copy ... is currently in the collections of the library or archives." 17 U.S.C. 
§ 108(b). 
44. In Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), a Federal District 
Court held that large scale copying and distributing of videotapes of educational television 
programs by a nonprofit educational cooperative was infringement, notwithstanding the educa-
tional purpose and informational nature of the works copied. Key factors for the court included 
not only that there had been systematic copying of entire works by the school system (as many 
as ten thousand copies in one year), /d. at 1181, but also that in copying films prepared for the 
school market the defendant inhibited plaintiff's ability to sell or license the films to other 
educational institutions. /d. at 1178. 
45. When an author transfers copyright to the publisher, the publisher has copyright in each individual 
article and also in each issue as a collective work. The Texaco court noted that "each of the eight 
articles in Catalysis was separately authored and constitutes a discrete 'original work of author-
ship.'" Texaco, 60 F.3d at 926. 
46. Recent decisions, however, emphasize less the quantity appropriated and more the significance 
of the portion copied. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539 (1985); Basic Books v. Kinkos Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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from the Journal of Catalysis, the Texaco court concluded that this factor 
clearly favored the plaintiff. One suspects that a court could reach the same 
conclusion in a case involving library document delivery, even though Con-
gress expressly permits libraries to copy entire articles under the section 108 
library exemption. 
The Fourth Factor: Harm to the Copyright Owner 
A common denominator synthesizing court decisions throughout the 1980s and 
into the 1990s has been a determination whether the copyright owner was 
harmed by the copying. This fourth factor is described in the act as "the effect 
of the use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. "47 
For several years this factor was considered the most important of the 
four.48 However, the Campbell court recently commented that courts should 
not attach any greater significance to any factor: "All are to be explored, and 
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright."49 
Both Campbell and Texaco stated that the fourth factor requires an exami-
nation of more than the market impact of the copying by the individual 
defendant. Courts must "consider not only the extent of market harm caused 
by the particular action of the alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted 
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for the origi-
nal."50 Courts are much more likely to find infringement when the copyright 
owner incurs financial harm due to unauthorized (or uncompensated) copying. 
Under a two-part analysis, one would examine whether the library's activities 
harm the value of or market for the copyrighted work and then whether the 
requestor's use of that work harms the copyright owner. 
Before Texaco one might have asserted confidently that an individual-
whether a university professor or a corporate researcher-could make a single 
copy of journal article under fair use. As long as the individual, or his or her 
employer, did not profit directly from making that copy-by reselling it, for 
example-that single act of copying did not appear to harm the value of the 
work copied. Similarly, a library's copying and distributing a single copy of 
an article on request does not, on its face, harm the value of the particular work 
copied. 
47. 17 u.s.c. § 107. 
48. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
49. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171. In reversing the appellate court judgment, the Supreme Court stated 
that "[i]t was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the commercial nature of [the parody] 
rendered it presumptively unfair. No such evidentiary presumption is available to address either 
the first factor, the character and purpose of the use, or the fourth, market harm, in determining 
whether a transformative use, such as parody, is a fair one.'' /d. at 1179. 
50. /d. at 1177 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, at § 13.15[A][4]. The Texaco court 
commented that ... [t]he fourth factor is concerned with the category of a defendant's conduct, 
not merely the specific instances of copying. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 927 n.l2. 
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The publishing industry maintains, however, that harm occurs in both 
instances. In Texaco publishers argued successfully that the copyright owner 
was denied royalties or license fees because Texaco should have made royalty 
payments through the Copyright Clearance Center for the copied articles. 
It is not hard to see that every act of copying harms the copyright owner if 
recipients of articles always had to purchase reprints or pay royalties for every 
instance of copying. This circular reasoning makes fair use disappear.51 But 
fair use (and section 108, for that matter) are very real, and Congress intended 
those sections to have some teeth (if not fangs). 
The fourth factor presents another element: whether the plaintiff must 
prove that its market was harmed by the copying or, instead, whether the 
defendant must show it was not. In 1982 the Sony court said, "If the intended 
use is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of harm to the market for the work] 
may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must 
be demonstrated."52 The Supreme Court revised this approach in Campbell. 
The Campbell court stated that the burden should not shift so quickly; a 
court will presume harm-and require the defendant to demonstrate that the 
market for the work copied was not harmed-only in circumstances of verba-
tim copying for commercial purposes.53 Under either approach, a publisher that 
charges a nonprofit library with infringement would carry the burden of 
demonstrating market harm so long as the library did not profit from its 
document delivery activities. (By contrast, harm would be presumed in an 
action against a commercial information broker.) 
Having concluded earlier (when examining the first factor) that Texaco's 
copying was for a commercial purpose, the Second Circuit found that the 
burden fell on Texaco to demonstrate that the market for the Journal of 
Catalysis from which their researcher made copies was not harmed. Texaco 
could not meet this burden. The court found that the publisher lost sales of 
additional journal subscriptions, back issues, and back volumes, and also 
licensing revenue and fees that Texaco could pay directly to them or through 
the Copyright Clearance Center. 
51. For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Judge Jacobs' dissent in Texaco: 
In this case the only harm to a market is to the supposed market in photocopy licenses. The CCC scheme 
is neither traditional nor reasonable; and its development into a real market is subject to substantial 
impediments. There is a circularity to the problem: the market will not crystallize unless courts reject the 
fair use argument that Texaco presents; but under the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to be an 
infringement unless (assuming other factors also weigh in favor of the secondary user) there is a market 
to be harmed. At present, only a fraction of journal publishers have sought to enact these fees. I would 
hold that this fourth factor decisively weighs in favor of Texaco, because there is no normal market for 
photocopy licenses, and no real consensus among publishers that there ought to be. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 937 
(Jacobs, J. dissenting). 
52. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. . 
53. A court should not presume market harm in "a case involving something beyond mere duplication 
for commercial purposes. . . . [W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the 
entirety of an original, it clearly 'supersede[s] the objects,' ..• of the original ~d serves as a 
market replacement forit" Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1177. 
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The approach would be little different in the case of noncommercial library 
document delivery. Campbell says that a plaintiff claiming infringement must 
prove harm when the defendant copied for noncommercial purposes, the 
situation that applies in the case of nonprofit libraries. A Texaco-like analysis 
ensures that copyright owners will have little trouble meeting this burden. 
One may speculate whether courts might indeed accept the AAP's argu-
ment that little distinguishes for-profit information brokers from library docu-
ment deliverers. It is not inconceivable that courts might consider the for-
profit/nonprofit distinction legally insignificant when analyzing the first fair 
use factor. The other fair use factors appear identical. · 
Equally plausible, courts might distinguish large document delivery opera-
tions from smaller ones. Libraries that promote their services widely to outside 
users-particularly the corporate sector-maintain separate records, employ a 
large staff whose wages are paid from document delivery proceeds, and 
function as a separate unit within the library might be less likely to survive a 
fair use analysis than libraries that receive only occasional requests from 
outside users. 
But even large-scale library document delivery may be fair. Although the 
fourth fair use factor no longer remains "the single most important element of 
fair use,"54 the Texaco court implied that the first (purpose of the use) and 
fourth (market harm) factors are more important than the second (nature of the 
copyrighted work) and third (the amount copied). 55 Nonprofit (perhaps, espe-
cially, public) libraries that provide document delivery at or below their cost 
ought not be likened to profit-motivated information brokers. This fundamen-
tal difference may convince a court that library document delivery-at least at 
some level-falls within fair use. The Williams & Wilkins case is also relevant 
here. 
Because an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims 
decision, some contend that Williams & Wilkins has limited precedential value; 
others criticize the decision or believe it no longer has continued viability.56 
The Texaco court implied that the copying done by NLM and NIH would not 
be permitted today, particularly considering the ease with which royalties may 
be paid through the Copyright Clearance Center. 57 
54. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566. 
55. "We conclude that three of the four statutory factors, including the important first and fourth 
factors, favor the publishers." Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931. 
56. See, e.g., HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT§ 15.05(D)[3] (1995); NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 42, at§ 13.05[e][4][c]. 
57. "Texaco contends that Chickering's photocopying constitutes a use that has historically been 
considered 'reasonable and customary.' We agree with the District Court that whatever validity 
this argument might have had before the advent of the photocopy licensing arrangements 
discussed below in our consideration of the fourth factor, the argument today is insubstantial. As 
the District Court observed, 'To the extent the copying practice was 'reasonable' in 1973 [when 
Williams & Wilkins was decided], it has ceased to be 'reasonable' as the reasons that justified it 
before [photocopying licensing] have ceased to exist.'" Texaco, 60 F.3d at 924. 
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However, Campbell reiterated that it was the intention of Congress to 
restate the common law when it enacted section 107: "Congress meant§ 107 
to 'restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or 
enlarge it in any way,' and intended that courts continue the common law 
tradition of fair use adjudication."58 Williams & Wilkins was the common law 
in 1976, and Congress arguably sanctioned the type and level of copying done 
by NLM and NIH when it passed the 1976 act. 
One also should remember that NLM and NIH employed policies that 
limited to some extent the number and nature of copies made (although the 
libraries themselves admitted that they often granted exceptions). NIH made 
only a single copy of an article requested, limited copying to no more than one 
article per issue (and never more than half of an issue), and generally limited 
copying to forty or fifty pages. NLM provided only one copy of an article on 
request, and it would not copy more than one article from an issue or three 
articles from a volume. NLM also would not copy from 104 journals on a 
"widely available" list and would not honor an excessive number of requests 
from one individual or institution. At the very least, libraries should develop 
policies that provide some limits on their document delivery activities, perhaps 
along the lines of those established by NLM and NIH. 
Electronic Copying 
The publishing industry is understandably concerned that the electronic age 
makes it easier for libraries to digitize materials and distribute them electroni-
cally. Publishers worry that libraries can more easily perform document deliv-
ery-which may lead to more copying-and also recognize that scanning 
enables libraries to create databases of digitized works. In addition, recipients 
of digitized documents can retain those documents indefinitely in their own 
databases and easily redistribute them within (and indeed outside) their organi-
zations. 
The section 108 library exemption does not address library scanning and 
digitizing print materials. Because the Copyright Act is technologicillly neu-
tral, some contend that "[i]f it is permissible for a library to make a copy of a 
work under section 108, it is permissible to make an electronic copy. As 
libraries move beyond photocopying for a user, then it is permissible to scan 
a copy and transfer it electronically to the user."59 
It is important to remember that copies distributed by libraries under 
section 108 must become the property of the user. 60 A library should never 
58. Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1170 (quoting H. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 13, at 66, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680). 
59. GASAWAY & WIANT. supra note 22, at 43. 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 108(d), (e). 
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retain a scanned copy in a database; it should delete the digitized copy 
immediately after transmission. 61 This is similar to the rule libraries should 
apply to copies transmitted by telefacsimile: after the fax transmission, destroy 
the photocopy. 62 
The possibility that recipients of lawful copies might subsequently violate 
copyright should not restrict activities permitted under the act.63 Publishers' 
uneasiness that digitization makes it easier for recipients to make and distribute 
additional unlawful copies should not limit library and user rights under section 
107 or 108. 
One other matter warrants mention. The CONTU Guidelines provide that 
libraries that receive requests from other libraries should not send copies absent 
attestation that the request complies with the guidelines. 64 Even though this is a 
requirement that virtually defies enforcement, librarians should not neglect the 
attestation requirement for requests made by phone or electronically. 
Possible Liability 
Conceivably even large-scale document delivery is permissible under fair use 
or the library exemption. But what if a court concluded that the copying was 
not permitted by sections 107 or 108? 
A library generally would be liable for infringing acts of its employees 
performed within the scope of their employment. An aggrieved copyright 
owner may recover actual damages and profits from the infringer or alterna-
tively elect to recover statutory damages to be determined by the court. 
Statutory damages may range from $500 to $20,000 for each work infringed. 
If the infringement was willful, damages may go as high as $100,000.65 
61. "When the library retains a scanned copy and creates a database of articles, it is the equivalent 
of retaining photocopies which clearly is not permitted under the Act. If the library wished to 
retain the scanned copy, then it must seek permission from the copyright holder to do so and pay 
royalties if requested. This is precisely what commercial document delivery services such as 
CARUUnCover are doing." GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 22, at 51. 
62. /d. at 50. 
63. The Sony court refused to hold the Betamax manufacturer vicariously liable. "The Betamax can 
be used to make authorized and unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, but the range of its 
potential use is much broader than the particularly infringing use." Sony, 464 U.S. at 436-37. "If 
vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold 
equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to 
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials." /d. at 439. "The sale of copying equipment, 
like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the 
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses." /d. at 442. 
64. See supra note 16 and accompanying text discussing guideline 3 of the CONTU guidelines. Note 
that CONTU guidelines focus on interlibrary arrangements for photocopying and therefore apply 
to requests received from other libraries. 
65. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
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However, Congress is much more forgiving of innocent infringers. If the 
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts were 
infringing, statutory damages may be reduced to not less than $200. Further-
more, a court will not award statutory damages if the infringer was an employee 
of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives who acted within the 
scope of his or her employment and believed and had reasonable grounds for 
believing that the copying was a fair use under section 107.66 
Library Practices 
Notwithstanding all the literature on libraries and copyright,67 librarians who 
operate fee-based document delivery services remain uncertain whether they 
must pay royalties. Many libraries do not, under the theory that making a single 
copy on request is either a fair use or permitted under section 108. Still, some 
of these libraries pay royalties under certain circumstances, such as when a 
requestor affirmatively asks that royalties be paid (in which case the requestor 
reimburses the library for the payment) or if the copying is excessive, such as 
a request for several articles from the same journal issue. 
Some libraries do pay royalties. Many of these libraries have joined the 
Copyright Clearance Center and make royalty payments on a routine basis 
through the CCC. Although some libraries pay royalties for every copy made, 
others do so only when they can make payments conveniently through the 
CCC. On first glance, this appears a curious practice. One might think that 
when royalties are appropriate-if the copying is not permitted under the 
act-they are due always and not only when it is convenient to pay them 
through the CCC. However, this practice does not seem so odd when one 
observes the importance of the CCC to both the trial and appellate courts in 
the Texaco litigation. 
In the trial court decision, Judge Laval stated, "[T]he monumental change 
since the decision of Williams & Wilkins in 1973 has been the cooperation of 
users and publishers to create workable solutions to the problem .... Most 
notable has been the creation of the CCC, and its establishment of efficient 
licensing systems."68 Although Texaco argued that the CCC was irrelevant to 
the action, the court disagreed. "Reasonably priced, administratively tolerable 
licensing procedures are available that can protect the copyright owners' 
interests without harming research or imposing excessive burdens ofusers."69 
66. !d. § 504(c)(2). 
67. For example, in the last few years a number of copyright books have been published, such as: 
JANIS H. BRUWELHEIDE, THE COPYRIGHT PRIMER FOR LIBRARIANS AND EDUCATORS (2d ed. 1995); 
LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
IN THE 1990's (1994); ARLENE BIELEFIELD & LAWRENCE CHEESMAN, LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHT 
(1993); RUTH H. DUKELOW, THE LIBRARY COPYRIGHT GUIDE (1992). 
68. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. I, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
69. !d. at 25. · 
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The appellate court concurred: "Though the publishers still have not estab-
lished a conventional market for the direct sale and distribution of individual 
articles, they have created, primarily through the CCC, a workable market for 
institutional users to obtain licenses for the right to produce their own copies 
of individual articles via photocopying."70 
Alternatively, a library might resolve the uncertainty by deciding to enforce 
the CONTU "Suggestion of 5" on behalf of those who use the library's 
document delivery service. Remember that the numerical guidelines apply to 
requestors; they suggest that when in a single year a library requests more than 
five copies of articles published within the last five years from the same jeurnal 
title, it is likely using "ILL" as a substitution for purchase of that title. By 
enforcing the guidelines on behalf of its clients, the sending library would pay 
royalties after it copies, for the same client, five articles from the same journal 
title in one calendar year. 
Guidelines, Please 
Libraries that provide document delivery should, regardless of their size, have 
in place a written copyright policy. At the risk of offending everyone-librar-
ies, their clients, and the publishing industry-this article concludes with 
proposed guidelines for library document deliverers. 
1. The library will pay royalties whenever appropriate regardless of whether 
a specific title is registered with a licensing organization such as the 
Copyright Clearance Center. Royalties may be paid either to the licensing 
organization or directly to the copyright owner. 
2. The library will make only one copy of a requested item at one time for a 
requestor without payment of royalties or permission. 
3. The library will make multiple copies of the same item for the same user 
(including the user's institution), whether made simultaneously or over a 
period of time, only with permission of the copyright owner or upon 
payment of royalties. 
4. The library will not copy more than half of a periodical issue without first 
receiving permission to copy or payment of royalties. 
5. The library need not ask the requestor how he or she plans to use the copy. 
However, the library should not fill a request if it knows that the requestor 
plans to sell the copy for a profit, such as the case of commercial informa-
tion brokers, absent permission to copy or payment of royalties. 
6. If the library first photocopies materials for subsequent transmission by 
facsimile, the library will destroy the photocopy after the transmission is 
complete. 
70. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930. 
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7. If the library downloads text to disk to prepare a copy for transmission to 
a requestor, the library will destroy the electronic copy after the transmis-
sion is complete. 
8. A library that requests materials from other libraries in order to fill its own 
clients' requests will follow the CONTU Guidelines regarding number of 
materials requested and records maintained. Records will include the name 
of the requestor and his or her institutional affiliation, the item copied, the 
number of copies made, and the date of the transaction. These records shall 
remain confidential and shall be destroyed three calendar years after the 
end of the year in which the request was made.71 
9. The library may fill requests from other libraries that include an attestation 
that the request complies.with the Copyright Act or the CONTU Guide-
lines. The library will not provide copies if it know's that the request 
exceeds fair use or the section 108 exemption absent such attestation or 
attestation that the requestor has received. permission or will pay royalties. 
10. The library will include with the copy the "notice of copyright" if that 
notice is readily available. The library will stamp all copies as follows: 
"This material may be protected by Copyright Law (Title 17, U.S. Code). 
Further reproduction in violation of that law is prohibited." 
71. Many states have enacted legislation to ensure the confidentiality of certain library records. See, 
e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 2.1.342(B)(8) (Michie 1995). 
